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In 2019, a strong field produced two front runners, and after deliberation the jury awarded first prize to Boria Sax, with Stephanie Harp as worthy runner-up – congratulations to them both. 2019 was also noteworthy in that Boria Sax became the first person to win the Eisenstein Prize twice, having previously been awarded it in 2010.

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2019 Eisenstein Winning Essay

WHEN ADAM AND EVE WERE MONKEYS: ANTHROPOMORPHISM, ZOOMORPHISM AND OTHER WAYS OF LOOKING AT ANIMALS

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Introduction

In September 1906, a pygmy named Ota Benga (Figure 12.1) was exhibited in the monkey house by the New York Zoological Park. Bones scattered around his enclosure, in the context of common racist stereotypes, suggested savagery and perhaps even cannibalism. His teeth had been filed to points, so they looked a bit like the fangs of a crocodile. An orangutan was placed in the cage, ostensibly to keep him company. Benga brought in huge crowds, but the exhibit immediately provoked protests, especially from the African-American community. After a while, Benga, who had up till then shown a pleasant disposition, became uncooperative and almost violent, so he was allowed to move freely on the grounds, but thousands of raucous tourists followed him about. After only three weeks, the zoo ceased to display Benga.

It was not unusual for indigenous people such as the Inuit or Saami to be exhibited alongside beasts in the latter nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, although placing a human being in the monkey house had been unprecedented. The permeable boundary between human beings and animals was a constant source of uneasy, boisterous humour. It was not always easy to tell whether people were laughing at the animals, at themselves, or at society. It was not always easy to separate showmanship from science or entertainment from education. Perhaps the public enjoyed the presentation of Benga as a sort of proverbial ‘wild man’, including the titillating suggestion of cannibalism, while knowing full well that it was just a show.

When Benga departed from New York, the gap he left was filled within a few months by a popular chimpanzee named Baldy (Figure 12.2), who was constantly mentioned in the newspapers, and, though he did not cause much controversy, may well have been as big an attraction as the pygmy who preceded him. Like Benga, Baldy was originally from the Congo.

Upon arriving at the Bronx Zoo in January 1907 at approximately the age of four, he quickly acquired a reputation for unusual intelligence, and may have been accorded a status a bit above that of other animals. According to an article in a Jeffersonville, Indiana newspaper, Baldy was allowed to move freely throughout the monkey house when no visitors were present. One day he found a keeper’s set of keys on a table, went to the keeper’s room, tried a few keys in the lock until he found the one that fitted, opened the door and walked in. When he found the keeper washing his face with soap and then drying himself with a towel, Baldy immediately went to the sink and did the same. He was becoming ‘human’. Many such anecdotes were told of Baldy, who was studied by
primatologists, fraternised with by zookeepers, and adored by the public. But several points in the news story strain credulity. Did the zoo really allow a chimpanzee that much freedom? Were those accomplishments real? In parts of the account at least, the journalist was probably conflating Baldy and Benga.

Figure 12.1 Ota Benga at the Bronx Zoo, 1906. Courtesy Wikipedia.
Indigenous people on public display had been, at the time, shown in settings that emphasised their reputedly ‘primitive’ character. The apes, by contrast, were presented in ways that made them appear as ‘civilised’ as possible. In both instances, stereotypic images were used to construct a sort of ‘missing link’ between life in the wild and modern society.4 At many zoos around the turn of the century, apes were taught to smoke pipes or cigars, guzzle alcoholic drinks from bottles, type, play musical instruments, roller skate, and ride in carts drawn by dogs. At the New York Zoological Park, they would, among other acts, be displayed sitting at a table and drinking tea from fine china.5 A newspaper article reported how Baldy was the first ape to learn to eat with a knife and fork. He was then assigned to teach this skill to the orangutans, who sat with him in chairs around a table. Soon, a quarrel broke out over food, and Baldy hit one of the orangs with a chair.6

At times Benga had been characterised by the zoo administration and the press as a ‘zookeeper’. When criticised for racism, a menagerie official once explained, ‘If Benga is in a cage, he is only there to look after the animals’.7 The zoo later decided that Baldy would also be promoted to the rank of keeper, and he was given a custom-made uniform including shoes to wear on the job. Then it was time to show him about the entire zoo. Everything went well, and a crowd of over a thousand visitors soon gathered to watch, until Baldy entered the reptile house and was spooked by the anaconda. He tore off his shoes, ran off, and started climbing around the grounds, tearing his uniform to shreds, until the keepers finally managed to lead him back to the monkey house. Needless to say, the crowd loved the spectacle.8 Baldy continued to represent the zoo, often dressed in human clothes, and greeted visiting dignitaries including President Taft by shaking hands with them.9

After his release, Benga learned considerable English, moved to Virginia, took a job, and became accepted by the local community around Lynchburg, but committed suicide in 1916.10 Baldy also became depressed, which might have been due to psychological trauma or, more likely, physical illness. A report in the New York Zoological Society Bulletin stated that he had become ‘[…] so savage at times that it is difficult to enter his cage’.11 He died a week or two afterwards in January 1914, probably from simian tuberculosis.12

The zoo in the early twentieth century was, in many ways, unlike the sanitised institution that we know today. People would often put on formal attire to visit, but, otherwise, it was a pretty rowdy place, and there was a good deal of interaction between animals and human beings.13 Despite the claim of being educational, the zoos were often not very different from the side shows, ‘freak shows’ if you will, in the circus. The zoo made little or no
pretence of placing the animals in a natural environment. There was, from our contemporary point of view, amazingly little care taken for safety of either the animals or the people. One brilliant but eccentric herpetologist, Grace Wylie, at Chicago’s Brookfield Zoo allowed poisonous snakes to move freely about her office and possibly beyond, convinced that they had been tamed. The feeding of live rodents to anacondas and other snakes was at times a popular, though controversial, event, which brought gusts of horror and fascination.

The traditional zoo is a very anthropocentric institution, since it assumes a sharp divide between the animals, who were there to be looked at, and human beings, who do the looking. The concept of ‘anthropocentrism’ can often seem very abstract and elusive, but, as I wish to show in this essay, its manifestations can be very tangible. These include perceived zoomorphic hybrids, such as Ota Benga, and anthropomorphic hybrids, such as Baldy. In the first instance, traits associated with animals are projected onto human beings. In the latter instance, human traits are attributed to animals. The way Baldy could immediately fill the role of Benga illustrates how zoomorphism and anthropomorphism address much the same need. Neither of these would be possible without the ontological division between the two realms of human beings, or ‘civilisation’, and animals, or ‘nature’.

What is anthropocentrism?

It is easy to use events of the past to foster a feeling of superiority, but much harder to ascribe responsibility for them, and hardest of all to draw useful lessons. Many newspaper articles from the beginnings of their sojourns at the New York Zoological Park speak of both Benga and Baldy with affection, yet the treatment was of Benga was, in retrospect, very exploitative. Baldy was never, so far as we know, treated abusively, though perhaps the uncertain status between ape and human being was stressful for him as well. Should we blame the zoo authorities? The public? The spirit of the times? It could even be that Benga, despite his traumatised condition, knowingly acted out the role of a wild man, becoming a party to his own exploitation. It may also be that Baldy thought of himself as ‘human’ and behaved accordingly or at least enjoyed being the centre of attention. Spectators may have mistaken fear for excess energy or anxiety for merriment. At any rate, the anthropomorphic and zoomorphic displays addressed psychological needs that were ultimately a product of anthropocentrism. The ontological divide between the human and natural realms creates a need for mediators, which must be alienated from both domains.

The term ‘anthropocentrism’ literally means ‘centred around human beings’, and was initially a theological concept. It referred to the Jewish, Islamic, and Christian practice of attributing qualities borrowed from human society such as ‘just’ or ‘righteous’ to a transcendent God. The question addressed by philosophers such as Maimonides and Aquinas was whether this implicitly accorded an exaggerated importance to humanity, thus undermining our humility before the Deity. The concept sank into obscurity during the Renaissance, as humankind, at least in the West, gained in collective self-confidence. It was revived in the early twentieth century, but it was used mostly to designate an exaggerated sense of human significance in relation to the natural world. Ecological thinkers such as Aldo Leopold and John Muir argued that all forms of life had value independent of their relationship to human beings, a position that came to be known as ‘biocentrism’. In the latter twentieth century, the concept of ‘anthropocentrism’ was also taken up by the animal rights movement, as a means to criticise a humanism that ignores or slight the interests of animals.

In this chapter, I will use the term ‘anthropocentrism’ as it is understood by anthropologist Philippe Descola. This is one of a handful of ontologies with which human cultures endeavour to make sense of the world. Others are animism, totemism, and analogism. All of these may be found to some degree in many, possibly all, human cultures, but one or another may predominate in certain times and places. Animism prevails in most of Africa and in most indigenous cultures of the Americas, while totemism does in the aboriginal culture of Australia; analogism is the norm in East Asia.

Only in the modern West is anthropocentrism the primary means of organising experience. It involves a sharp division of the world into the realms of humanity (i.e., ‘civilisation’) and nature. Bruno Latour has written at length of how anthropocentrism, understood in this way, entails the endless task of trying to purify both the human and natural realms, yet constantly produces hybrids, since the division is highly artificial. The two domains are in perpetual contact in a virtually endless number of ways, so there are constant occasions for blending and merging. The methods of natural science, for example, are applied to society, thus undermining the idea of human autonomy. The methods of the humanities are then applied to science, which is pronounced ‘socially constructed’. Trying to keep the two realms pure is a bit like trying to keep sand from falling into the ocean or waves from breaking onto the land.

Understood in the broadest way, ‘hybrids’ would include sociobiology and deconstruction. In this chapter, however, I will use the word ‘hybrid’ in a less inclusive way than Latour, to refer to what I believe is a special instance of this blending. I have in mind figures that combine not only the domains but also the
physical and social characteristics of both animals and human beings. One identity must be primary, whether it is as an animal, in the case of Baldy, or as a human, in the case of Benga. There is usually friction between the two identities as animal and human, which can result in laughter, pathos, aggression, or terror. Since both zoomorphism and anthropomorphism are based on an assumption of radical human distinctiveness, they are often, as examples in this chapter will demonstrate, found together. In many cases, one may even be substituted for the other, much as Baldy was used as the replacement for Benga.

The development of anthropocentrism

In the inner caverns of the cave paintings from Paleolithic Europe, there are relatively few hybrids of animals and human beings, but one is the famous ‘sorcerer’ at Trois Freres in France, which shows a man bearing the horns of a stag. Early towns and cities, especially when surrounded by walls, mark off a human realm, distinct from the natural world that surrounds it. Composite figures of animals and people become more common in Neolithic times, and they then proliferate dramatically in the depictions of Egyptian deities, which frequently combine human bodies with animal heads. Thoth, the god of wisdom, often had the head of an ibis, and Anubis, god of the dead, had that of a jackal. But, while these figures blend the physical features of animals and people, it is very questionable whether the mixing extended to fundamental ontologies. The general absence of humour, revulsion, or fear suggests a lack of tension between their human and bestial identities.

In moderate instances, it can be very hard to distinguish anthropomorphism from empathy for animals or even distributed consciousness. There are legitimate debates about this today in the field of psychology, but when animals are depicted speaking human languages, wearing human clothes, or participating in parliamentary debates, the anthropomorphism is unmistakable. Both the Mesopotamians and Egyptians did, however, occasionally produce clearly anthropomorphic figures, cartoonish images of animals standing on two legs and acting ‘human’. The best known example is the Sumerian Harp of Ur, now in the University of Pennsylvania Museum of Archeology, dated from around 2800 BCE. At the top is the golden head of a bull with a beard of lapis lazuli. Inlaid figures along the side depict as a lion, a bull, a deer, a scorpion, and a fox playing musical instruments, drinking from vessels, and conversing like people.

Anthropocentrism intensifies in Greece, where the deities are consistently given human form. The Greek idealisation of the human figure seems intended in part to distinguish people sharply from simians and other animals by emphasising such features as high foreheads, ease of balance on two feet, and a relative lack of body hair. A very anthropomorphic portrayal of animals is found in the fables traditionally attributed to the half-legendary Aesop, a slave on the Isle of Samos in the seventh century, who was allegedly given his freedom and made advisor to the king for his skill in telling stories. These tales developed from the tradition of Sumero-Akkadian animal proverbs, but the degree to which Aesop’s lions, donkeys, and foxes speak and interact like men and women had few if any recorded precedents.

Zoomorphism, the sister quality to anthropomorphism, is a bit less dramatic in Greek culture, though it may be seen in many Greek myths of transformations. The sorceress Circe changed men into pigs and other animals. Zeus, who usually had a human form, changed himself into a swan to seduce the maiden Leda. His wife, Hera, changed Io, one of Zeus’s mortal mistresses, into a heifer, and then sent a fly to drive her through the world. Zoomorphism is even raised to the level of philosophy when Aristotle writes in Politics that non-Greeks, since they do not take part in political life, are essentially animals.

Greco-Roman culture may border on being anthropocentric, but there is less ambiguity about Western culture in the modern period. When artists and writers of the Renaissance revived the Greek tradition of idealising the human form, it was an attempt to purify the human essence of bestial contamination. The same period brought the depiction of countless fantastical hybrids, figures that blended features of animals and human beings. These monsters appear in the margins of illuminated manuscripts and later in the work of artists such as Hieronymus Bosch, Martin Schongauer, and Pieter Bruegel the Elder.

Many people read Descartes’ Discourse on Method (first published 1637) as the manifesto of anthropocentrism, since he makes a very abrupt distinction between human beings, which have a soul, and all other creatures, which lack one. Although Descartes never denied that animals have emotions, he believed they were without reason or language and, therefore, completely lacking in autonomy, while people alone had free will. Nevertheless, Descartes is often given too much credit or blame for ushering in the modern era. His readers were confined to the intellectual elite and,
even there, most of his ideas were never very widely accepted. But, although there have always been many countervailing tendencies, the abrupt distinction between civilisation and nature has gradually come to pervade Western intellectual life.

It is particularly difficult to lay aside anthropocentrism, since this is not only implicit in the way we answer ethical questions, it is even more central to the questions themselves. Suppose, for example, we ask whether it is ethical to hunt. Well, for whom? Nobody is likely to question the morality of a chameleon hunting flies or an American robin hunting worms. A few farmers might consider it wrong for wolves to hunt sheep, but most people would accept that as natural. Clearly, we mean the question to apply only to human beings, who live by a unique code. Should we decide that hunting is not ethical but make an exception for, say, American Indians, on the basis of their culture and history, we would at least partially dehumanise them. Anthropocentrism is inherent in the very idea of rights, which implicitly divides creatures into those that have them and those that do not, and that boundary itself is not affected at all by shifting certain animals such as apes and dogs from one side to the other.

Drolleries

The West has held what may well be a uniquely negative view of apes and monkeys at least since the Greco-Roman civilisation. Up through the Renaissance, scholars often quoted the dictum Cicero has attributed to Ennius in De natura deorum: simia quam similis turpissima bestia nobis ('The ape, vilest of beasts, so much resembles us'). The West has no simian culture heroes similar to Hanuman, who fights alongside Krishna in India or Old Monkey, who becomes a Buddha in China. It is a paradox that the evolutionary kinship of man and ape in evolution should have been discovered in precisely that part of the world where one might have expected it to encounter most resistance. Nowhere outside of Western culture has evolution been perceived as especially humbling to humankind.

For much of the Middle Ages, apes and monkeys in Western art were generally devils. These were, however, only vaguely simian figures which owed virtually nothing to observation and were based mostly on Greco-Roman mythological creatures such as satyrs or on Egyptian deities such as Thoth. Tompkins observes that ‘their dark, spidery bodies bristling with a vaguely sexualized menace [...] seem to compress within itself everything in the natural world that was frightening or troubling to the Christian mind’.

This changes around 1200, as macaques, imported and displayed to the public by travelling menageries, grow increasingly familiar. Monkeys, since they were expensive and difficult to maintain, became a status symbol in the homes of aristocrats and some clergy, though other clergy railed against them as an indulgence.

In the drolleries, whimsical fantasies in the margins of illuminated manuscripts of the Middle Ages, monkeys were the animals depicted most frequently. They would be shown doing just about everything that people did, such as fighting with swords, jousting, dancing, playing bagpipes, or minding human babies, in a way that set a clear precedent for the anthropomorphised apes such as Baldy in zoos of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Some of these pictures probably show acts by trained monkeys, which were taught to perform tricks such as somersaults and services such as collecting and eating lice.

There is obviously a good deal of irony the illustrations, yet, as with apes like Baldy, it is not always clear at whom it is directed. Are the monkeys in illuminated manuscripts mocking human pretensions? Or is it the simians that are being mocked? In societies where weapons such as swords, activities such as hunting deer, and even the wearing of certain colours was prohibited to the peasantry, allowing monkeys to indulge in such acts freely could also have been a way of taunting the lower social orders. Perhaps, sometimes at least, the aristocrats were claiming a sort of solidarity with the natural world in their domination of the peasantry. Above all, however, the simians represent a primeval innocence, unimpeded by the bonds of law and social convention, like that of Adam before the Fall.

The monkeys of Eden

By the early modern period, the boundary between human beings and animals becomes a subject of contention, and zoomorphism becomes far more pronounced. Simians no longer represent demons but sinners. Since, however, Christians related to God primarily as sinners, this made apes and monkeys into quintessential human beings. With sin came the possibility of redemption through repentance. Depictions of monkeys begin to take on complex, allegorical meanings, which are not easy to interpret, in the Renaissance and early modern periods. One example is a page from La
Bible en François, published by Verard Antoine in Paris around 1500 (Figure 12.3), which shows a scene of the Garden of Eden in a sphere that is emerging out of the root of a tree. Depicted in the centre of the sphere is the Tree of Knowledge, around which the serpent - which bears the torso and face of a woman - is coiled. On the left side of the tree is Adam and on the right is Eve, each of whom is holding an apple. A monkey eating an apple sits on the far right. Adam’s gaze points to Eve, but both she and the serpent are looking over at the monkey. Eve is about to follow the example of the simian, after which Adam will copy her.

The monkey is the major centre of attention here, not the first couple or the snake. The animal seems to bear much responsibility for the fall of humankind, yet there is nothing the least bit diabolical about it. On the contrary, the simian is portrayed with a good deal of affection. Its diminutive size suggests a child, and it could perhaps represent the future, the (somewhat degenerated) progeny of the first man and woman. The monkey, in other words, is all of us. The Fall is portrayed essentially as a natural event, without anguish or moralising. In the foreground in front of the tree is a panther, a traditional symbol of Christ, looking at Adam.37

This essential symbolism is made even more complex in an illustration to the Matthew Bible, first printed in 1537, by Erhard Altdorfer (Figure 12.4). Adam and Eve are sitting beneath an apple tree. Above them are two monkeys cavorting in the branches. The smaller monkey is giving an apple to the larger one, a very clear anticipation of original sin. God is looking down at the face of Adam, whose gaze is fixed on Eve. The first woman looks upward and points at a third monkey, smaller than the other two, which is hanging upside down from a branch.38 That monkey seems to be an offspring of the simian couple, so perhaps Eve is asking Adam for a child. The way she is looking upwards suggests religious devotion, and, though the idea may at first seem blasphemous, it is not too far-fetched to see a symbolic relation between the baby monkey and Christ. It was, at any rate, entirely usual to view imagery of the natural world as a sort of book in which one might read religious parables.
Figure 12.3 From the Bible initially published by Antoine Verard, 1510 edition. Courtesy Cambridge University Library.
Figure 12.4 Erhard Aldorfer, illustration showing Adam and Eve, from the Matthew Bible, first published in 1537. Courtesy Cambridge University Library.
Altdorfer may be the first landscape painter in Western art, and he was certainly among the first to consider the natural world an entirely worthy artistic subject. In his historical, religious, and mythological paintings, the trees and lakes in the background very often overshadow the human beings. Like Eve in the woodcut, his attention very often turned away from people to the natural world. Perhaps he understood the biblical story of Eden as an allegory with significance that went beyond humankind to encompass animals and vegetation.

The depiction of simians by Jan Brueghel the Younger, unlike those of Verard and Altdorfer, is anthropomorphic, since it projects a human story onto a group of animals. A simian Adam and Eve possibly first appear in painting about 1620 in his ‘Terrestrial Paradise’ (Figure 12.5). It shows verdant forest in which the animals from lions to deer are living together peacefully in mated pairs. No human beings are present, but, in a high tree, one monkey
is holding out an apple to her mate, as a red parrot, one of very few solitary animals in the picture, looks on. All three animals are perched on a horizontal branch, and between the two monkeys rises a large twig, which resembles traditional depictions of the Tree of Knowledge. The two monkeys correspond to the first humans in the story of Eden, and they establish an iconographic pattern that will be repeated in many natural history books through at least the nineteenth century.

**Man, ape, or satyr?**

Throughout recorded history the status of human beings in relation to animals has been a point of ambiguity, and our own era is, in this respect, less different from previous ones than many people think. Widely disseminated tales of talking animals and shape-changers in all eras have made human beings and animals appear to interact on an everyday basis. At the same time, there have been legal, religious, and traditional practices that differentiated radically between the human and animal realms. As long as the social order seemed relatively stable, and people believed it was ordained by God, questions of nomenclature were no more than intellectual exercises. But, as that order was increasingly questioned, these definitions increased in importance.

Before the work of Linnaeus in the early eighteenth century, there had been very little aspiration to a modern sort of scientific precision in the classification of animals and, for that matter, human beings. Designations were taken eclectically from old mythologies, biblical lore, traveller’s tales, and observation. Labels such as ‘human’, ‘wild man’, ‘ape’, ‘satyr’, ‘siren’, and ‘sphinx’ were used fairly loosely, and they were not necessarily mutually exclusive. For many purposes, this informal system functioned pretty well, until explorers and traders created confusion by bringing back ever more accounts of exotic animals and people to Europe. Early modern culture faced a crisis of language that was, in many ways, similar to what we are experiencing today, as we struggle to make sense of a world in which robots are taking over many traditional roles of human beings. The old vocabularies were inadequate to integrate the new information. Reports constantly confused indigenous people, apes, and legendary creatures.

Early modern descriptions of apes reflect this consternation. The scientific study of simians dates from 1641, when the body of an ape was dissected by the Dutch anatomist Nicolaas Tulp. It may have been a chimpanzee, since he states that it came from Angola, but the picture that accompanied his description looks far more like an orangutan. He found that the anatomy of the creature was, in most respects, nearly identical to that of human beings, but concluded that it was the satyr of Greek mythology, because such creatures in Borneo reportedly captured and ravished women.

The binomial classification of Linnaeus, in which all living things were included in a single system of hierarchic classification, was intended to banish such confusion by placing creatures in an unambiguous order, which would show the wisdom of God. Apes and human beings, however, did not seem to fit easily into his system of classification. Linnaeus troubled many of his contemporaries simply by including humankind in his taxonomy at all, thereby acknowledging that people are animals, but his love of order took precedence over his belief in human exceptionalism. Leaving men and women out would have made it impossible to address questions of human identity.

In the tenth edition of his *Systema Natura* (1758), which laid the foundation for modern taxonomy, Linnaeus classified human beings as primates, together with apes, monkeys, and bats. He further divided people into *Homo sapiens*, or people with knowledge, and *Homo troglodytes*, or cave dwellers. *Homo sapiens* was further divided into five subspecies. In addition to the Asian, European, American, and African varieties, there was an additional category called *Homo sapiens monstrosus*, which could accommodate any anthropoid figures that did not fit neatly into the other classes, such as Patagonian giants, people with birth defects, and, quite possibly, some apes. *Systema Natura* may have changed the terms of the debates, yet it did nothing to alleviate the confusion.

**Zoomorphic humans**

At least until the early modern period, simians are conspicuously absent from most paintings of scenes such as Noah’s Ark or the Garden of Eden, in which artists tried to show an inventory of the animal kingdom. The reason for this absence is probably that artists felt they were already implicit in the human figures, in Noah, Adam, and Eve. While the relationship may not have been formally codified as a point of taxonomy, people intuitively felt that simians were not entirely distinct from men and women.
The idea of kinship between human beings and apes goes back to very early times, and observation of simians formed the basis of legends of giants, wild men, and other folkloric figures. Mythological figures such as satyrs, cynocephali, and sphinxes that were basically human in form have often been considered apes. According to many legends, simians were human beings that had degenerated or been punished for bad behaviour. In one, they were people who built the Tower of Babel, and then ran into the forest as it collapsed. In another, Enos, Adam’s grandson, was punished by God for idolatry by being given the features of an ape, which were then passed on to his descendants. In many legends from Northern Europe, Adam originally had a tail. In a story from the Talmud, God simply removes Adam’s tail to increase his majesty by setting him apart from the animals. In some legends, Eve is made from Adam’s tail rather from his rib, an idea used to explain why women are supposedly more bestial than men.

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The early modern shoemaker and folk poet Hans Sachs wrote that the apes were the result of a failed attempt to imitate the miracles of Jesus, when a smith placed his mother-in-law in a furnace and then doused the flames with water, believing this would make her young again. Her screams terrified members of her family, who, together with the elderly woman, all turned into apes. Such tales are zoomorphic in that they transfer the behaviour and appearance of animals, in this case apes, to certain human beings. They regard the boundary between human beings and animals as being easily permeable, and consider human status as something that can only be maintained through vigilance.

One early work which combines anthropomorphic representation of animals with zoomorphic depiction of human beings is *Gulliver’s Travels* by Jonathan Swift, first published in 1726-35. One of his journeys takes the hero, Gulliver, to the island ruled by talking horses called ‘Houyhnhnms’, who are notable for their high level of civilisation and generosity. Living alongside them are savage humans known as ‘Yahoos’, who wallow in filth and constantly fight over stones. Gulliver is taken under the protection of a horse, which becomes his ‘master’, and then attends a meeting where Houyhnhnms, debate whether to exterminate the Yahoos. One of those in attendance alleges that ‘the Yahoos were the most filthy, noisome, and deformed animal that nature ever produced’.

The Yahoos were inspired by reports of ‘primitive’ people in exotic lands, and Swift was saying, in effect, that the level of civilisation rather than species determined the worth of a creature, and an animal such as a domestic horse counted for more than a savage.

Westerners of pre-modern times generally viewed history as a gradual process of degeneration that would lead ultimately to an apocalypse. In the latter eighteenth and through to about the mid-twentieth century, this progression, for many people at least, was turned around, becoming the ideal of progress. All along, people generally assumed that apes were similar yet inferior to human beings. If the world was getting worse, humans were becoming apes; if it was improving, apes were becoming human. When the outcome appeared uncertain, you might find elements of both.

For artists such as Altdorfer, zoomorphic representation of apes had been a means to comment on the universal human condition. Over the next several centuries it increasingly became a way of denigrating people, especially those of certain races or ethnicities. Black Africans were especially often portrayed with simian features, and so, to an extent, were East Asians, Germans, Jews and many other groups of people. But, according to Curtis, in England, ‘By the 1860s no respectable reader of the comic weeklies […] could possibly mistake the sinuous nose, long upper lip, huge projecting mouth, and jutting jaws as well as the sloping forehead for any other category of undesirable or dangerous human being than that known as Irish’.

For the most part, the caricatures of ‘Negroes’ in the American South or of the Irish in the English press were not very different from the anthropomorphised monkeys and apes of the modern era (Figure 12.6). All of these were frequently portrayed dancing, playing musical instruments, idling about, getting drunk, and fighting. While there were clear differences in emphasis, both the simian parodies and the racial stereotypes appeared to go about normal human activities without the accompanying cares, and both were viewed with a blend of scorn and muted admiration. But this sort of patronisation could easily give way to hatred. During World War II the Nazis depicted the races they considered ‘degenerate’ with simian features, while Americans portrayed the Japanese as monkeys.
Figure 12.6. ‘The ballot box of the future’, cartoon from The Day’s Doings, a newspaper published in London and sold in the United States, 1870. Author’s collection.

**Anthropomorphic apes**

From a zoomorphic perspective, apes and monkeys would be degenerate human beings, but, from an anthropomorphic point of view, they would be either primitive ones or children. In the Modern Period, the representation of monkeys would grow increasingly anthropomorphic. Artists would give monkeys and apes ever more attributes of human beings, though in ways that always accentuated, and virtually never placed in question, the inferior status of those simians.

The tradition of extreme anthropomorphism in the depiction of simians, established in drolleries of the late Middle Ages, expanded to other forms. In the rococo style of the eighteenth century, centred at the French court, simians were viewed essentially as playful, mischievous children. Pet monkeys were often portrayed in gardens or even in homes, to suggest a charming, if ultimately futile, revolt against the more stifling norms of society.52 Depictions of apes and monkeys wearing clothes and engaged in human activities remained common in a variety of genres such as murals and Dutch tiles. In the early eighteenth century, the Meissen porcelain works in Dresden established a fashion for miniature sculptures of monkeys in the wigs and elegant jackets of aristocrats, playing musical instruments and dancing.53

As people began to think of history in terms of progress rather than decline, they increasingly portrayed apes as striving toward the condition of humanity (Figure 12.7). Just as the fruit suggested degeneration, a walking stick, enabling a primate to stand upright, suggested an aspiration toward evolutionary ‘improvement’. Many, perhaps most, apes in illustrations from books of natural history of the latter eighteenth through to the...
mid-nineteenth centuries maintain human posture with the assistance of a cane. Occasionally, an ape will have a staff in one hand and a fruit in
the other, as though to acknowledge the possibilities of both progress and decadence.

The motif of a simian Adam and Eve would appear regularly in illustrations to popular books of natural history throughout the Victorian era (Figure
12.8). The couple might be chimpanzees, orangutans, tamarins, howler monkeys, or any other variety of primate.54 The smaller primate would
have a more cunning expression and be holding out an apple, at times even offering it to the larger one. As the controversy about evolution in
the nineteenth century intensified, the idea of Adam and Eve as apes combined the biblical and evolutionary perspectives. According to Corbey,
‘By the nineteenth century, apes had begun to take over Adam’s ancestral role’.55 As Haraway puts it, ‘Implicitly and explicitly, the story of the
Garden of Eden emerges in the sciences of monkeys and apes, along with versions of the origins of society, marriage, and language’.56 It is hard
to know to what extent the religious references were conscious, but they probably comforted people by placing the relatively innovative idea of
evolution in a familiar context. In assuming Adam’s position as the progenitor of humankind, apes and monkeys inevitably also took over
symbolism, themes, and motifs from the biblical story of the first couple. Most especially, attention to primates focused on loss of primeval
innocence and acquisition of knowledge.

An apex of anthropomorphism came, as we have seen, in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, when zoos constantly displayed
simians clothed and engaged in human activities. That tradition was revived briefly in the 1970s, when efforts to teach human language to apes
produced a generation of simian celebrities similar to those in zoos around the start of the twentieth century. Perhaps the most popular of these
was Nim Chimpsky, whose role as a mediator between the human and bestial worlds makes him especially reminiscent of Baldy. Nim was raised
as a human being, fed human food, dressed in human clothes, and imperfectly toilet-trained, before Herbert S. Terrace at Columbia University
attempted to teach him a variant of American Sign Language. When his trainers reported dramatic initial success, Nim became a media star, and
was also drawn into a vortex of personal feuds and academic politics. Eventually, Terrace concluded that Nim was mechanically repeating signs
without understanding, and withdrew his original claims.57 As researchers scaled back their initial contentions about the linguistic ability of apes,
public interest in them also faded.5
Figure 12.7 Illustration to Captain Cook’s Voyages, 1785, showing many examples of anthropomorphism and one of zoomorphism (lower left). Author’s collection.
Evolution

In the latter nineteenth century, there was a relatively brief return to the early medieval practice of showing apes as demonic, in reaction against Darwin’s theory of evolution. The gorilla, especially, was often shown as a vicious monster, capable of killing indiscriminately and even raping human women. Apart from this, however, the immediate impact of evolutionary theory on the depiction of apes, monkeys, and human beings is not easily apparent. Many had already, as we have seen, generally thought of the boundary between humans and animals as permeable. Several thinkers such as Aelian, Plutarch, and Montaigne had already questioned, or at least significantly qualified, the idea of human superiority long before Darwin, and the theory of evolution did not immediately lead to any dramatic increase in such scepticism. If human beings were animals, they had to be superior animals, the most ‘advanced’ on the proverbial ‘scale of evolution’.

Any doubts about human superiority were initially overpowered by the excitement that people felt at dramatic changes. When Darwin published his *On the Origin of Species* in 1859, steam power was transforming daily life, railroads were starting to link major urban centres, European colonial empires were expanding, and confidence in human progress was near an apex in the West. It would not be until around the end of the twentieth century that, facing the prospect of ecological disaster, many people would begin to seriously question the idea of human superiority.
Darwin, for all his importance as a scientist, was in ways a fairly typical Victorian gentleman who took the ‘civilising’ mission of the British Empire for granted. In his book *The Descent of Man*, we find the combination of anthropomorphism and zoomorphism that runs through modern culture, as he repeatedly contrasts the moral and intellectual refinement of certain animals, especially dogs and monkeys, with the crudeness of indigenous peoples. The book concludes, « For my part, I would as soon be descended from that heroic little monkey who braved his dreaded enemy in order to save the life of his keeper […] as from a savage who delights in torture of his enemies […] and is haunted by the grossest superstitions. »

**Beyond anthropocentrism**

The display of Benga had been, or at least was sometimes rationalised as, an attempt to show the kinship of man and ape in Darwin’s theory of evolution, and that surely applies to Baldy as well. The nervous titters and slapstick routines that accompanied both exhibitions suggest that the zoo authorities and the public may have felt greater anthropological anxiety than they were aware of. Both exhibitions, especially that of Baldy, came on the eve of World War I, which marked the start of a gradual but intense disillusion with the idea of human exceptionalism, though it would often resurface in both open and covert ways.

Both Benga and Baldy had been, at least since they were taken to the zoo, profoundly alienated figures, cut off from their original environments yet unable to adapt to their new one. The contexts in which they were exhibited were designed not to alleviate that alienation but to dramatise it. Benga was deprived of his humanity, while Baldy was severed from his simian character. Both were called ‘zookeepers’, but if Benga had only worn a uniform while Baldy had done without one, the displays would not have been nearly so dramatic. Their popularity may owe much to the way in which visitors to the zoo saw their own alienation as human beings from nature mirrored in the solitary figures. Although this was certainly not a matter of conscious intent, the exhibits may echo a religious paradigm that had been passed on over millennia. Within the world of zoo animals, Benga and later Baldy represented the human race, assigned dominion over lesser creatures, a bit like the Biblical Adam.

In summary, both zoomorphism and anthropomorphism are ways in which, after dividing the cosmos into the human realm or ‘civilisation’, ruled by autonomous choices, and nature, ruled by instinct and necessity, we create hybrid identities. Zoomorphism absorbs animals, or ‘animalistic’ traits, into the human sphere; anthropomorphism projects human traits into the natural realm. There is nothing fundamentally wrong with either of these processes, particularly when indulged in moderation, but in practice they are usually predicated on absurdly simplified notions of both human beings and animals.

Traditions that go back at least to the eighteenth century maintained that ‘man is the tool-using animal’. Researchers then very belatedly, in the later twentieth century, discovered the use and even the creation of tools by many other creatures such as apes, crows, and octopuses. In consequence, we raised the status of those creatures and started to think of them as at least partially ‘human’. But the definition of ‘man’ as a ‘tool-using animal’ was, from the beginning, preposterously simplistic. It might, had it been accurate, set us somewhat apart from other beings, but it could not possibly have done any justice to the intricate blend of qualities that really do make human beings special. When we then partially extend this stereotypical definition to other animals, we inevitably stereotype them as well.

We may also say, following the tradition of Descartes, that man is the animal with language. That claim has never been very widely accepted, and has now, at least in its extreme forms, been refuted in so many ways that it seems redundant even to list them. We not only share language with animals from vervet monkeys to ravens but also with computers and strands of DNA. A scholar might consider the electric impulses released by many fish, the colour changes of many lizards, and the chemical signals of many plants to be language, in that they can disseminate information with considerable precision.

But let us suppose for a moment that the definition of ‘man’ as the only animal with language were accurate. It would still do no justice whatsoever to the richness and complexity of human identity. What makes us special is not language so much as the things that we say by means of it. Following Chomsky, one might modify the initial definition and say that the unique feature of human beings is our grammar. If true, it does not have the cosmic significance that polemists for or against Chomsky (though not Chomsky himself) at times ascribe to it. While a remarkable ability, the use of grammar conveys no more superiority than the strength and suppleness of a spider’s thread. When we base claims of status on such narrow criteria, we trivialise our human identity. If we then extend those claims to other creatures such as apes, we belittle them as well.
Zoomorphic hybrids are based on similarly stereotypical understandings. Suppose, for example, somebody calls a group of people ‘apes’. Theoretically, this could mean all sorts of things, and by no means all of them are insulting. It might simply mean that the people in question are good at climbing or very strong. In practice, however, the words are certain to be understood in a derogatory way. We would take them to mean the individuals are crude, foolish, and impulsive.

We now seem to be as incapable as ever of viewing apes and monkeys as anything but incomplete human beings. We make a great deal of fuss, for example, about their tool use, but, while more sophisticated than many researchers had once anticipated, this is still an area in which people vastly excel them. The amazing leaps of gibbons among branches in the forest canopy, which no human being in his right mind would even attempt, are at least as impressive as elementary use of tools, yet human beings give gibbons very little credit for them.

We might do more justice to both other species and our own by viewing human beings as an amalgamation of features that are complex, elusive, mysterious, and utterly unique, yet impossible to capture in a simple formula. Humanity, in this sense, is in perpetual flux, and neither good nor bad. We might regard other creatures from monkeys to octopuses and butterflies in a similar way, without trying to reduce their existence to any single quality. There is nothing wrong with taking a degree of collective pride in our linguistic ability as human beings. If we can only do it without triumphalism and/or orgies of guilt, identifying the unique qualities of our species may help us to find our place in the community of living things. We should not judge people according to their resemblance to animals, nor animals by their similarity to human beings.

This, in my opinion, was intended by Pico della Mirandola in his *Oration on the Dignity of Man* of 1486, the original manifesto of Humanism, when, citing a Chaldean proverb, he proclaimed, ‘Man is a living creature of varied, multiform, and ever-changing nature’. This is clearly a description, not a definition by exclusion. Would Pico have extended this to other creatures such as apes or octopuses? My impression is that he would, though, because of Pico’s cryptic style, that is not entirely clear. At any rate, we certainly can, and that would make both us and other living things a lot more interesting.

Notes

1 This chapter incorporates material from my review essay entitled ‘The cost of human exceptionalism (review of *Spectacle: The Astonishing Life of Ota Benga* by Pamela Newkirk)’, published in *Humanimalia* 7, 1 (2015) and available online at www.goo.gl/aAWrqc, accessed 24 August 2015. I would like to thank my wife, Linda Sax, for her help in editing this chapter and for useful suggestions. It was she who first noticed the religious symbolism in some of the pictures of apes that I had collected from books of natural history.


3 Baldy also a Missing Link’, *The Daily Reflector*, 11 November 1910, 1.

4 Bradford and Blume, *Ota* 183.

5 These examples of ways in which simians were displayed are all depicted on postcards printed by prominent zoos in the latter eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, which are in my private collection. The last example given may have been copied by keepers from displays in Britain and Continental Europe, where such shows were called ‘chimpanzee tea parties’. See D. Hancocks, *Zoo animals as entertainment exhibitions*, in R. Malamud (ed.), *A Cultural History of Animals in the Modern Age*, Oxford: Berg, 2011, 95-118, 102-106.

6 “Baldy” hits “Babe” with chair; reduced to nurse, he repents’, *Portsmouth Daily Times* 10 October 1910, 3.

7 Newkirk, *Spectacle* 47, 50, 209-210. There are confused and contradictory accounts as to whether or to what extent Benga was held captive. We have no photographs of the enclosure where he was on display, and the issue may never be clarified entirely. For a rebuttal of the claims that he was held prisoner, see: M.S. Gabriel, ‘Ota Benga having a fine time’, *New York Times*, 13 September 1906, 6.

8 ‘Ape dislikes garb: simian protests against wearing guard’s uniform; simian “Baldy” begins to disrobe in tree as big crowd follows and cheers’, *The Goshen Mid-Week News-Times* 3 October 1911, 7.


10 Newkirk, *Spectacle* 242-246.
34 For a discussion of the apparent contradictions in contemporary attitudes towards animals, see: H. Herzog, *Some We Love, Some We Hate, Some We Eat: Why It’s So Hard to Think Straight about Animals*, New York: HarperCollins, 2010.
36 Marks, *What it Means to be 98% Chimpanzee*.}

To check this observation, on 8-10 June 2015, I counted the number of simians in pictures of Noah’s Ark that had been placed online by the following museums: the Metropolitan Museum of Art (New York), the National Gallery of Art (Washington DC), the Boston Museum of Fine Arts, the Rijksmuseum (Amsterdam), the Louvre (Paris), and the Tate Gallery (London). In pictures showing the animals in Noah’s Ark before 1600, I found 51 without simians and only one with them.

37 Janson, *Apes and Ape Lore* plate XVI. 128. Note that Janson misreads the direction of Eve’s gaze and mistakenly thinks she is pointing to the monkey couple.
40 For a discussion of the apparent contradictions in contemporary attitudes towards animals, see: H. Herzog, *Some We Love, Some We Hate, Some We Eat: Why It’s So Hard to Think Straight about Animals*, New York: HarperCollins, 2010.
42 Marks, *What it Means to be 98% Chimpanzee*.
51 Ape and Ape Lore, 134-135.


Herzog, H. Some We Love, Some We Hate, Some We Eat: Why It’s So Hard to Think Straight about Animals; New York: HarperCollins, 2010.


Janson, H.W. Apes and Ape Lore, in the Middle Ages and Renaissance; London: Warburg Institute, University of London, 1952.


Pico della Mirandola, G. Oration on the Dignity of Man; Washington DC: Gateway, 2012 [1486].


Swift, J. Gulliver’s Travels; New York: Barnes & Noble, 2003 [1735].


